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Approaching Prosumer Social Optimum via Energy
Sharing with Proof of Convergence
Yue Chen, Changhong Zhao, Steven H. Low, Fellow, IEEE, and Shengwei Mei, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—With the advent of prosumers, the traditional cen-
tralized operation may become impracticable due to computa-
tional burden, privacy concerns, and conflicting interests. In this
paper, an energy sharing mechanism is proposed to accommodate
prosumers’ strategic decision-making on their self-production
and demand in the presence of capacity constraints. Under this
setting, prosumers play a generalized Nash game. We prove
main properties of the game: an equilibrium exists and is
partially unique; no prosumer is worse off by energy sharing
and the price-of-anarchy is 1−O(1/I) where I is the number of
prosumers. In particular, the PoA tends to 1 with a growing
number of prosumers, meaning that the resulting total cost
under the proposed energy sharing approaches social optimum.
We prove that the corresponding prosumers’ strategies converge
to the social optimal solution as well. Finally we propose a
bidding process and prove that it converges to the energy sharing
equilibrium under mild conditions. Illustrative examples are
provided to validate the results.
Index Terms—Energy sharing, generalized Nash equilibrium,
prosumer, bidding algorithm, distributed mechanism
NOMENCLATURE
A. Indices, Sets, and Functions
i,I Index and set of prosumers.
Si Action sets of prosumer i, and S = ∏i∈I Si.
fi(pi) Cost function of prosumer i.
ui(di) Utility function of prosumer i
Ji(pi,di) Net cost of prosumer i, which equals to fi(pi)−
ui(di); and J(p,d) = ∑i∈I Ji(pi,di).
Γi(p,d,b) Total net cost of prosumer i with sharing, which
equals to fi(pi)−ui(di)+λ (−aλ +bi).
PoA(G) Price of anarchy of a game G.
Yi Any (pi,di)∈Yi satisfies the capacity constraint.
B. Parameters
I Number of prosumers.
pi, pi Lower/upper bound of prosumer i’s production.
di,di Lower/upper bound of prosumer i’s demand.
a Energy sharing market sensitivity.
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C. Decision Variables
pi Production of prosumer i.
di Demand of prosumer i.
λm Dual variable of the power balancing condition.
λ Energy sharing price.
qi Amount of energy prosumer i gets from sharing.
bi Bid of prosumer i in the energy sharing market.
p̃i, d̃i Optimal strategies under centralized paradigm.
p̂i, d̂i Strategy of prosumer i at sharing equilibrium.
p̌i, ďi Strategy of prosumer i under self-sufficiency.
I. INTRODUCTION
IN the US, over 81,000 distributed wind turbines witha cumulative capacity of 1,076 MW had been deployed
during 2003-2017 [1]. The residential solar photovoltaic (PV)
panels had risen from 3,700 MW to 150,000 MW from 2004
to 2014 [2]. Advances in these technologies, together with
decline in cost, have encouraged traditional consumers to
produce and store energy at home, via distributed energy
resources (DERs), electric vehicles, and batteries [3], turning
them into so-called “prosumers”. They can play a proactive
role in energy management. However, a large number of
participants, asymmetric information, and conflicting interests
also impose great challenges [3].
Typically there are three types of prosumer management
approaches as shown in Fig. 1 [4]. The first one (on the left
of Fig. 1) adopts a centralized operation [5]. The operator
of a microgrid or a virtual power plant (VPP) gathers all
information and makes a centralized decision, aiming at mini-
mizing the total net costs of all prosumers under management.
Then dispatch orders are sent to each prosumer to execute.
Since the number of prosumers is increasing rapidly, the
traditional centralized approach becomes impracticable both in
computational burden and privacy requirements. The second
one (in the middle of Fig. 1) uses a market structure similar
to the retail market. The operator announces a price, based
on which every prosumer, as a price taker, decides how much
energy to consume/produce/buy/sell [6]. It is hard to decide
on an effective energy price especially with a large number of
prosumers, since private information may be needed and each
prosumer’s capacity is too small to be observed. Inspired by
the concept of “sharing” in other sectors, the third approach
(on the right of Fig. 1) has captured increasing attention in
recent decades. Here, a prosumer is allowed to exchange/share
energy with other prosumers, and they are turning from price-
takers to price-makers. This can be done in a peer-to-peer
(P2P) structure [7] or with the assistance of a platform [8]. As
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Fig. 1. Prosumer management paradigms.
revealed in [9], energy sharing can be a promising direction
in managing prosumers, since it can achieve a nearly social
optimal solution in a distributed manner. Various research
projects have been carried out on related issues, such as
Piclo [10] in the UK, TransActive Grid [11] in the US, and
Enexa [12] in South Australia. The successful operation of
energy sharing relies on a well-designed mechanism, and
existing research about energy sharing mechanism design can
be classified into two categories:
Cooperative game based approach. In this approach, first a
profit distribution scheme is designed, and then each prosumer
chooses its strategy taking into account possible reallocation.
The key point here is to design an effective distribution
scheme so that all prosumers are willing to collaborate to
achieve a certain goal (usually social optimal). Profit dis-
tribution schemes for storage sharing were developed under
two scenarios [13], [14]. Reference [15] systematically es-
tablished a pragmatic distributed control and communication
mechanism for achieving efficient and resilient coordination
of networked microgrids. A mathematical program with equi-
librium constraints (MPEC) was used for DER sharing among
prosumers, and the coordination surplus was split among the
aggregator and prosumers [16]. A random sampling method
was proposed to estimate the Shapley value of a P2P energy
sharing game [17]. The trading mechanism with Shapley
value was compared with three traditional mechanisms, i.e.,
bill sharing, mid-market rate, and supply-demand ratio [18].
The cooperative game based sharing can achieve a desired
equilibrium with proper distribution rules. However, these
rules may require prosumers’ private information and thus be
difficult to implement.
Noncooperative game based approach. This category char-
acterizes the conflicting interests of prosumers, and can be
further divided into bilateral contract based approach and
auction based approach. Under the bilateral contract based
paradigm, trading offers are posted and handshakes are made.
First, each prosumer is registered as a seller or a buyer. Then,
during the trading periods, both the sellers and buyers put
forward several offers and try to find the best match. Once
a contract is approved by the operator, the corresponding
offers are removed [19]. This mechanism allows sharing to
be performed in an asynchronous manner. A key feature of
the bilateral contract based approach is scalability in terms
of both the outcomes and the process to reach them. A
bilateral contract network with forward and real-time markets
was developed in [20]. Reference [21] presented a matching
algorithm for microgrid prosumers with minimum risk of
mismatch. There are relatively few analytical works based on
bilateral contracts, because the matching procedure of bilateral
contracts is hard to characterize [22]. Under the auction based
approach, some or all of the prosumers first bid on energy,
and then the market is cleared with the energy sharing prices
determined. An evolutionary game was used to model the
dynamics of buyers selecting sellers [23]. A Nash bargaining
model was adopted in [24] to address the shared charging of
electric vehicles (EVs). The energy trading interactions among
producers and consumers are modeled as a Stackelberg game,
where the producers are leaders and consumers are followers
[25]. A shared facilities controller can trade with several
residential units at a price in-between the selling and buying
prices of the grid, resulting in a win-win game [26]. The
“Elecbay” platform facilitates the peer-to-peer energy trading
was introduced in [27] with simulation of users’ bidding
processes. A double auction mechanism between sellers and
buyers was developed in [28]. In the above works, the role
of a prosumer as a buyer or a seller is predetermined and
cannot change during the bidding process, so that the sellers
can set selling prices, and then the buyers can decide on their
demand in response to these prices. However, basically each
prosumer could be either a buyer or a seller, depending on
other prosumers’ situations that are not known in advance. For
example, assume there are three types of prosumers, i.e. High-
Cost (HC), Medium-Cost (MC), and Low-Cost (LC). If MC
trades with HC, then MC would be a seller while HC would
be a buyer. In contrast, if MC trades with LC, then MC would
be a buyer while LC would be a seller. Predetermination of
market roles will greatly limit the flexibility of prosumers. To
overcome this limit, distributed peer-to-peer energy exchange
was modeled as a generalized Nash game in [29], which
proved that the set of variational equilibria coincides with the
set of social optima. In our previous work [8], a generalized
demand-bidding approach was proposed for node-level energy
sharing, and properties of the Nash equilibrium were proved.
This paper extends [8] with contributions summarized below.
Contributions
1) Impact. Over many decades, the traditional power system
operation structure has been proven to be quite successful and
reliable. Specially, at the demand side, customers are managed
by aggregators and usually not price-responsive. With the
prevalence of distributed energy resources (DERs), traditional
consumers are turning into so-called prosumers, who can
trade-off between supply and demand and participate in energy
management proactively. In addition, the intermittence and un-
certain nature of DERs call for stronger capability to deal with
real-time energy fluctuation. Exploiting demand-side flexibility
to support real-time energy balancing will reduce required
generation reserve and save costs. However, the traditional
centralized scheme fails to allow a customer to act upon its
profit maximizing philosophy, which reduces incentive and
restricts demand-side flexibility. Therefore, a new prosumer-
oriented approach is desired.
In our previous work [8], an energy sharing mechanism
was proposed and several desired properties of the market
equilibrium have been proved. We show in [8] that the
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outcome of the proposed energy sharing market approaches
that of the centralized operation with an increasing number of
prosumers. However, [8] merely focuses on the steady-state
property (equilibrium) of the energy sharing market, while this
paper studies its dynamic property. To be specific, a bidding
process in line with each participant’s economic rationality
is given in this paper, where each prosumer takes into ac-
count the impact of its bid on the sharing price. We reveal
that as the number of prosumer grows, the bidding process
turns out to have the same form as the Lagrange multiplier-
based method for distributed optimization of a centralized
problem. This means with more prosumers, not only does
its steady-state property converge to the centralized opera-
tion, so does its dynamic property. Therefore, many current
findings/technologies/theories under centralized operation are
likely applicable to the proposed energy sharing market.
2) Technical content. (i) Model. Extending [8], in which
only power balance constraint was considered with fixed
energy demand, this paper incorporates capacity limits and
variable demand, which is more flexible and practical. This
complicates the analyses in two ways: Firstly, the energy
sharing model in this paper can no longer be simplified to
a standard Nash game, but indeed is a generalized Nash
game whose equilibrium is hard to characterize [30]. Sec-
ondly, when analyzing each prosumer’s strategic behavior,
the complementary slackness conditions associated with the
inequality constraints introduce new difficulties. (ii) Equilib-
rium. Main properties of the proposed energy sharing game
are proved with three modifications/improvements compared
with [8]: The generalized Nash equilibrium is partially unique
(explained latter), instead of being unique in [8]. The energy
sharing game achieves a 1−O(1/I) price-of-anarchy (PoA,
which is less than 1 because net cost is negative in this paper).
Besides, as the number of prosumers increases, not only does
the total net cost in [8], but also individual prosumers’ strate-
gies, converge to the outcome under the centralized operation,
which is a new result not provided in [8]. (iii) Algorithm. A
bidding process is developed for achieving energy sharing in a
distributed manner. This paper provides guidance for selecting
market sensitivity parameter a so that the bidding process is
guaranteed to converge.
3) Our work also differs from [29]: The prosumers in
[29] have a quadratic cost function and a quadratic utility
function, while our design applies to a more general category
of strictly convex cost functions and strictly concave utility
functions. In [29], the prosumers are price-takers in that they
decide on their generation or consumption without taking into
account the impact of their decisions on the prices. In our
paper the prosumers are price-makers, and because of this, the
production and demand at generalized Nash equilibrium is the
optimal solution of (5) rather than the social optimal solution
in [29]. Moreover, our work reveals advantageous features of
the energy sharing design in Propositions 2-4 and provides
a practical bidding process (Algorithm 1), which were not
available in [29].
Comparison with Relevant Concepts
Energy sharing market & pool electricity market. Given
that the output of an individual prosumer is too small for it
to join the pool electricity market directly, a new approach
that allows prosumers to make a profit by exchanging energy
with each other is desired. A microgrid connecting those
prosumers would be an ideal venue to carry out such an energy
exchange, which motivates the energy sharing mechanism
proposed in this paper. Specially, in the pool electricity market,
a participant is registered in advance as a seller or a buyer,
usually a generator as a seller and a load as a buyer. Then
the market is cleared by setting a price so that the total
supply equals the total demand. However, in an energy sharing
market, each prosumer could be either a buyer or a seller,
depending on other prosumers’ decisions, so that its role is
endogenously determined by the sharing market.
The bidding process & Lagrange multipliers methods.
The Lagrange multiplier method [31] uses the shared multi-
pliers to coordinate different prosumers. The prosumers are
“price takers” in that they make their generation or con-
sumption decisions without taking into account the impact of
their decisions on the multipliers in the next iteration. This
process converges to the socially optimal solution. This model,
however, is not applicable to the case where the prosumers are
not price takers, but will make strategic decisions that take
into account of the impact of their decisions on energy prices.
In this case, our proposed bidding process will converge to
a generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) of the energy sharing
market (Proposition 1). Moreover the GNE converges to the
social optimal solution as the number of prosumers increases
(Proposition 3). We conjecture that our bidding process con-
verges to the Lagrange multipliers method as the number of
prosumers increases.
Notation. We use x := (xi, i ∈ I)T to denote a collection
of xi in a set I. The subscript −i means all components in I
except i. The Cartesian product of sets Si is denoted as ∏i∈I Si.
We use ḟ (.) to denote the first derivative of function f (.), and
f̈ (.) to denote the second derivative.
II. MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION
A. Problem Description
Consider I prosumers indexed by i ∈ I = {1,2, ..., I} in a
standalone microgrid. Assume each prosumer has a distributed
generator and a responsive load, whose cost (utility) functions
are modeled separately. Specifically, prosumer i produces
power pi at cost fi(pi); concurrently, its load consumes power
di to obtain utility ui(di); function fi is strictly convex, ui is
strictly concave, and both functions are twice differentiable.
Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that f̈i and −üi are
uniformly bounded over all i ∈ I where both the upper and
lower bounds are strictly positive and independent from I.
Traditionally, the operator manages all the prosumers in a
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di = 0 : λm (1b)
pi ≤ pi ≤ pi,∀i ∈ I (1c)
di ≤ di ≤ di,∀i ∈ I (1d)
where objective (1a) minimizes the total net cost (cost minus
utility) of all the prosumers. Define Ji(pi,di) := fi(pi) −
ui(di) and J(p,d) = ∑i∈I Ji(pi,di). Constraint (1b) enforces
microgrid-wide power balance (with dual variable λm). Con-
straints (1c)-(1d) impose constant capacity bounds pi, pi, di,
di on prosumer i’s generation and demand. We use problem
(1) as the benchmark for subsequent analysis.
Throughout the paper we assume:
A1: Problem (1) is feasible.
Due to strict convexity of objective function, under A1,
problem (1) has a unique optimal solution, denoted as (p̃, d̃).
Remark: The dual optimal solution λ̃m of (1) is unique if
there exists at least one prosumer that strictly satisfies (1c)
or (1d) at (p̃, d̃). A similar discussion about uniqueness of
locational marginal price (LMP) can be found in [32]. The
dual optimal λ̃m, known as the “shadow price”, indicates the
increment of total net cost should there be one more unit
production-demand mismatch. We will show that the energy
sharing price under the proposed mechanism converges to λ̃m
with a growing number of prosumers.
B. Rationality and Extensions for Assumptions
To facilitate theoretical study of fundamental structures of
the proposed mechanism, we have made a set of simplifying
assumptions, for which the underlying rationality and possible
extensions are discussed below.
(1) Cost and utility functions. We adopt strictly concave
utility functions [33] and strictly convex cost functions [34]
widely used in power systems. One example for cost function














constant parameters β 1i < 0, β
2
i > 0).
(2) Feasible set. We allow prosumers to adjust power
consumption within capacity limits, following a common
simplified demand response model [33], [35]. The proposed
mechanism is compatible with a fixed or precisely predictable
demand d0i by allowing di = di = d
0
i . Moreover, the box con-
straints (1c)–(1d) can be generalized to convex compact sets
uniformly bounded over i∈I, with which Propositions 1, 2, 4,
and (9) in Proposition 3 still hold. In practice, there might be
binary variables making the problem nonconvex and thus more
challenging. To partially address this concern, our proposed
mechanism can be applied in concert with appropriate convex
relaxation. For instance, the binary variables indicating battery
charging or discharging can be converted to complementarity
constraints and then tackled with the exact convex relaxation
method in [36].
(3) Neglecting network constraints. Our study is restricted
to a residential area or a small microgrid, whose aggregate
load only accounts for a small fraction of the total demand
at a specific node of a city-sized distribution network. In this
case it is reasonable to neglect network constraints, as what
has been done in [37]–[39].
(4) Single time step formulation. With the prevalence of
price-sensitive loads, power consumption and price can change
dynamically in response to and impacting each other. Besides,
the expanding deployment of DERs, which produce uncertain
outputs from geographically dispersed sites, will exert a huge
challenge to real-time power balancing. In this context, ana-
lyzing prosumer behavior and market reliability in real time
is a crucial topic [40]. Concerning this topic, we focus on
hour-ahead bidding in real-time market, which is commonly
modeled as a single time step problem [41]. Extension to
multiple time steps would improve practicality of this work,
e.g., to incorporate energy storage; however, it would also
tremendously sophisticate notation and presentation while only
adding limited value in revealing the fundamental structures
and properties of the proposed mechanism. Therefore, we
leave this extension for future work.
C. Practical Issues and Requirements
Although centralized management of prosumers can achieve
the lowest total net cost, it encounters two main difficulties
in practice: 1) it would be time-consuming when there are a
large number of prosumers; 2) information such as fi(.), ui(.)
is hard to obtain due to privacy concerns of prosumers. To
tackle these challenges, a distributed and scalable paradigm is
desired, which needs to be:
For process: 1) Private. Prosumer privacy is preserved. 2)
Distributed. Each prosumer makes its own decision based
on individual rationality. 3) Convergent. The bidding process
converges in finite steps.
For result: 1) Incentive. Prosumers are willing to participate
in sharing, and more participants lead to better performance.
2) Effective. The equilibrium satisfies physical constraints.
3) Meaningful. The price indicates the value of production-
demand balance. 4) Flexible. Prosumer’s role as a seller or
buyer is endogenously given instead of predetermined. 5)
Economical. The total energy sharing cost is lower than total
self-sufficiency cost and close to the social optimum.
To meet these requirements, we propose an energy shar-
ing mechanism among prosumers. The basic setting of the
proposed mechanism is developed in Section III, which is
characterized as a generalized Nash game. Main properties
of the generalized Nash equilibrium are revealed. A bidding
process is presented in Section IV with proof of its conver-
gence. Simulations results are shown in Section V to validate
our findings. Section VI concludes this work.
III. ENERGY SHARING GAME
A. Basic Settings
Prosumers participate in an energy sharing market to ex-
change energy with each other and make individual decisions
to maintain energy balancing. Specifically, prosumer i imports
net energy qi at market clearing price λ , which means paying
λqi to buy energy if qi > 0 and otherwise receiving revenue
−λqi by selling energy. The sharing framework is shown
in Fig. 2. Each prosumer is connected to a platform via a
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smart meter through a bidirectional information channel. The
information flow is explained below.
 
Fig. 2. Energy sharing framework between prosumers and the platform.
Step 1: (Initialization) Each prosumer i enters its private
parameters fi(.), ui(.), pi, pi, di, di to its smart meter i. Set
λ 1 = 0, and k = 1. Choose tolerance ε .
Step 2: Each smart meter i updates its bid bk+1i based on
the latest λ k, and sends it to the platform.
Step 3: After receiving all the bids bk+1i ,∀i∈I, the platform
updates price λ k+1 and sends it back to all the smart meters.
Step 4: If |λ k − λ k+1| ≤ ε , λ ∗ = λ k+1, go to Step 5;
otherwise, k = k+1 and go to Step 2.
Step 5: Each smart meter determines the optimal production
p∗i , demand d
∗
i , and sharing quantity q
∗
i based on λ
∗, and sends
them back to the corresponding prosumer to execute.
In the procedure above, private information is only required
by each prosumer’s own smart meter so that its privacy is well
preserved. Details about the mechanism will be explained in
Section IV. The key to our mechanism design is to determine
price λ and quantity qi,∀i ∈ I based on prosumers’ bids
bi,∀i∈ I. We use the generalized demand (or supply) function
[42] to depict their relationship:
qi =−aλ +bi, ∀i ∈ I (2)
where a> 0 is a parameter for market sensitivity, and bi is pro-
sumer i’s bid. Market clearing requires ∑i∈I qi = 0 for power
balance. Therefore, ∑i∈I(−aλ +bi) =−aIλ +∑i∈I bi = 0 and





Equation (2) is from the typical demand curve where
quantity qi is decreasing with price λ [42]. We extend it by
allowing qi to be negative for selling energy. The bid bi indi-
cates prosumer i ∈ I’s willingness to buy energy. Specifically,
equations (2)-(3) imply qi = bi− (∑ j∈I b j/I), which means
prosumer i is a buyer (qi > 0) if it is more willing to buy than
the average, and a seller otherwise.
The objective of each prosumer i∈ I is to minimize its cost
of production minus utility of consumption plus the payment
for buying energy (or minus the revenue from selling energy),




Γi(p,d,b) := fi(pi)−ui(di)+λ (b)(−aλ (b)+bi) (4a)
s.t. pi−aλ (b)+bi = di (4b)
pi ≤ pi ≤ pi (4c)
di ≤ di ≤ di (4d)
λ (b) =
∑ j∈I b j
aI
(4e)
The proposed mechanism (4) can be modeled as a game
with the following elements: 1) a set of players I; 2) action
sets Si(p−i,d−i,b−i),∀i ∈ I and strategy space S = ∏i∈I Si;
3) cost functions Γi(p,d,b),∀i ∈ I. We denote the game
compactly as G = {I,S,Γ}. The action of player i ∈ I is
composed of production pi, consumption di, and bid bi, with
action set Si defined by (4b)-(4e). A uniform price λ (b) is
determined by (4e), which couples all the players and thus
depends on other players’ actions b−i := (b j,∀ j 6= i). Since
λ (b) enters constraint (4b), action set Si defined by (4b) (with
other constraints) also depends on b−i, so that the proposed
mechanism is a generalized Nash game, whose equilibrium is
harder to analyze than a standard Nash game [30].
Definition 1. A profile (p̂, d̂, b̂) ∈ S is a generalized Nash
equilibrium (GNE) of the sharing game G, if ∀i ∈ I:
(p̂i, d̂i, b̂i) ∈ argmin Γi(pi,di,bi, p̂−i, d̂−i, b̂−i),s.t. (4b)− (4e)
B. Properties of the Sharing Equilibrium
We next unveil three major properties possessed by the
equilibrium of the proposed mechanism. Proposition 1 affirms
existence of an effective market equilibrium that satisfies its
defining constraints; Proposition 2 states that the equilib-
rium provides adequate incentive for prosumers to participate.
Proposition 3 shows that the proposed mechanism is econom-
ical, i.e., the total net cost ∑i∈I [ fi(p̂i)−ui(d̂i)] at equilibrium
approaches the socially optimal net cost ∑i∈I [ fi(p̃i)−ui(d̃i)].
Proposition 1. (Existence and Partial Uniqueness) A GNE of
game G exists if and only if A1 holds. Moreover, for any GNE
























di : ζ (5b)
pi ≤ pi ≤ pi : δ
±
i ,∀i ∈ I (5c)
di ≤ di ≤ di : κ±i ,∀i ∈ I (5d)
The proof of Proposition 1 is in Appendix A of [43].
Note that constraints (5b)–(5d) and (1b)–(1d) are identical,
which implies the migration from centralized operation to the
distributed mechanism does not sacrifice feasibility. Moreover,
energy sharing price λ equals “shadow price” ζ in (5). Dif-
ferent from the unique Nash equilibrium in [8], the GNE here
is partially unique. Specifically, (p̂, d̂) is unique, but there can
be multiple vectors b̂ leading to the same (p̂, d̂). The unique
vector (p̂, d̂) determines the total net cost ∑i∈I [ fi(p̂i)−ui(d̂i)].
Therefore, we use “partially unique” instead of “multiple” to
highlight the fact that the market efficiency is uniquely deter-
mined. Vector b̂ determines prosumer payment λ̂ (−aλ̂ + b̂i)
for i∈I. Note the proposed market has a self-balanced budget:
∑i∈I λ̂ (−aλ̂ + b̂i) = λ̂ ∑i∈I(−aλ̂ + b̂i) = 0, so that b̂ only
affects the inner profit allocation among prosumers.
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Regardless of difference in b̂, prosumers are always incen-
tivized to participate in sharing, as shown by next proposition.




s.t. pi = di (6b)
pi ≤ pi ≤ pi (6c)
di ≤ di ≤ di (6d)
and make the following assumptions:
A2: Problem (6) is feasible.
A3: Ji(p̌i, ďi)< 0,∀i ∈ I.
Under A2, problem (6) for each i ∈ I has a unique optimal
solution (p̌i, ďi) due to strict convexity of its objective function.
Assumption A3 reasonably assumes that under self-sufficiency,
each prosumer gets a negative net cost (positive net utility).
Proposition 2. (Pareto improvement) Suppose A2 holds, and
(p̂, d̂, b̂) is a GNE of game G. We have
Ji(p̌i, ďi)≥ Γi(p̂, d̂, b̂),∀i (7)
where strictly inequality holds for at least one i ∈ I unless
(p̌, ď) = (p̂, d̂).
The proof of Proposition 2 is in Appendix B of [43]. It ver-
ifies that the proposed mechanism can incentivize prosumers
to join since no prosumer is worse off and at least one can
benefit. A rare special case is that the self-sufficiency solution
coincides with the energy sharing equilibrium (in which case
it also coincides with the centralized social optimal for (1)).
Remark: One possible application scenario of our model
and method is the isolated/standalone microgrids [44], which
are designed to be energy self-balanced without a grid connec-
tion. In a standalone microgrid, the prosumers can be centrally
optimized as in problem (1) (whose solution is the social
optimum) or work self-sufficiently as in problem (6). It is
worth noting that under self-sufficiency, the prosumers may
have to sacrifice their utility in order to match its demand with
its generation. However, even under the centralized operation,
a prosumer does not always outperform what it would be
under the self-sufficiency mode. For instance, as shown later
in TABLE IV, Prosumer 2 and 3 actually have lower utility
under the centralized operation. To achieve not only a lower
social cost but also lower individual costs than self-sufficiency,
we propose the energy sharing mechanism to enable exchanges
among prosumers within a microgrid. We prove in Proposition
2 that all prosumers have the incentives to join energy sharing
since none of them will become worse-off, which is one
advantage of the proposed mechanism.
Additionally, our model could be extended to a system with
grid connection. For example, if we allow prosumer i ∈ I to
purchase additional net power pgi from the grid at price λ
g,
then since demand-side DERs usually have lower production
cost than thermal units in the grid, it is reasonable to assume
ḟi(pi) < λ g for all pi ∈ [pi, pi] and i ∈ I. If assumptions
A1 and A2 stills hold, at the optimal points of (1) and (6)
there is pgi = 0,∀i ∈ I. Therefore, the results in this paper
can be readily applied. Even without assumptions A1 and A2,
where prosumers might buy from the grid, prosumer i∈ I can
still obtain at least the same net utility in sharing as that in
self-sufficiency by letting bi = ∑ j 6=i b̄ j/(I−1). In other words,
Proposition 2 can be proved following a similar procedure to
that in Appendix B of [43].
Although prosumers have incentives to share energy, there
is still a gap between the total net cost of energy sharing (4)
and the socially optimal net cost for (1). Our next proposition
bounds this gap in terms of price-of-anarchy.
Definition 2. (Price of Anarchy, PoA [45]) Consider game
G = {I,S,Γ}. Let Seq ⊆ S be the set of strategies in equilib-
rium. Price of Anarchy (PoA) of game G is the ratio of the total













PoA measures how the overall efficiency of a game degrades
due to strategic behaviors of players. Particularly, a PoA equal
to 1 implies the game achieves social optimal.
Proposition 3. (Tendency) Suppose A1–A3 hold, and pi, pi,
di, di, fi(.), ui(.) over all i ∈ I are uniformly bounded by
numbers independent from I. Given I, let (p̂(I), d̂(I), b̂(I)) be
a GNE of game G, and (p̃(I), d̃(I)) be the unique optimal









) ≥ 1− C
I−1
(9)





∣∣d̂i(I)− d̃i(I)∣∣= 0, ∀i ∈ I. (10)
The proof of Proposition 3 is in Appendix C of [43]. Note
that PoA is conventionally larger than 1 with a positive cost at
social optimal [45]. In our work, by A3 and Proposition 2, the
total net cost is consistently negative across self-sufficiency,
energy sharing, and centralized socially optimal mechanisms,
which makes PoA less than 1. Proposition 3 shows that both
the total net cost and prosumer strategies at a GNE of the
proposed mechanism converge to those at the centralized
social optimal, with an increasing number of participating
prosumers.
Remark: PoA is an important concept measuring ineffi-
ciency of a market. A common phenomenon is that fiercer
competition leads to a more efficient market, but this is not
always true. Here is a counter example: There are I agents in
a market. Each agent can bid 0 or 1, and its profit depends on
other agents’ bids as shown in TABLE I.
TABLE I
PAYOFF MATRIX FOR EACH AGENT
bid 0 1
all other agents’ bids are 0 1 0
other cases 4 3
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Given other agents’ bids, the best strategy of an agent is
always to bid 0. Therefore, the market equilibrium is that all
the agents bid 0, at which the total profit equals I. However,
for I large enough, the maximum total profit is 4(I − 1).
Therefore, as we introduce more competition by making
I→+∞, PoA is actually decreasing (worse) and approaching
1/4, in which case the added competition does not improve
market efficiency. Therefore, we analyze PoA to ensure that
no exception as in the counter example above occurs to the
proposed mechanism. Moreover, analyzing PoA also reveals a
nontrivial result (9) that the proposed mechanism approaches
social optimal at a rate of O(1/I).
IV. BIDDING PROCESS
This section presents a bidding process and a range of mar-
ket sensitivity a that guarantees convergence of this process
to the GNE characterized in Section III-B.
A. Bidding Process
The bidding process is shown structurally in Fig. 2 and
elaborated in Algorithm 1. The key to this process is for each
prosumer to update its bid without knowing other prosumers’
actions. Specifically, at (k+1)th iteration, each prosumer i∈I
utilizes the up-to-date price λ k to estimate (due to the fact that
λ (p,d) is not known exactly) its optimal solution for problem
(4) which is equivalent to:
min
pi,di
fi(pi)−ui(di)+λ (p,d)(di− pi) (11a)
s.t. pi ≤ pi ≤ pi (11b)
di ≤ di ≤ di (11c)
Denote this estimated optimal solution as (pk+1i ,d
k+1
i ), and






Denote the feasible set of problem (11) as Yi. To estimate
(pk+1i ,d
k+1
i ), instead of simply replacing the term λ (p,d)(di−
pi) with λ k(di− pi), prosumer i considers the predicted impact
of its decision on price λ (p,d), by taking the partial derivative












= − di− pi
(I−1)a
−λ k (12)
where the last equality is because of
λ (p,d) =
(di− pi)+∑ j 6=i b j
(I−1)a
derived from (4b)–(4e). We obtain from (12) the following




+λ k(di− pi) (13)
and thus convert (11) to:
min
pi,di
(13), ∀(pi,di) ∈ Yi (14)
Algorithm 1: Energy Sharing Bidding
Input: input parameters fi(.), ui(.), pi, pi, di,di into
each smart meter i, tolerance ε .
Output: energy sharing results p∗,d∗,b∗,λ ∗.




for i = 1; i≤ I do
(pk+1i ,d
k+1

















until |λ k+1−λ k| ≤ ε;
B. Convergence
We provide the following condition, under which the pro-
posed bidding process can be proved to converge.









, ∀(pi,di) ∈ Yi, ∀i ∈ I
}
Proposition 4. When A1, A4 hold, Algorithm 1 converges
to a GNE of the energy sharing game G.
For proving convergence of the bidding process, we first
give the following lemma with its proof in Appendix D of




and Y = ∏i∈I Yi. Let h ∈ R1×2I be a vector with h2i−1 = 1


























and L(y,λ ) := φ(y)−λhy with dom L = Y ×R.
Lemma 1. When A4 holds, φ(y) is a convex function, and
L(y,λ ) has a (not necessarily unique) saddle point.
With Lemma 1, we next prove Proposition 4.





k into λ k+1 =
(∑Ii=1 b
k+1
i )/(aI), the k-th iteration of Algorithm 1 becomes:
yk+1i = argmin{(13)|yi ∈ Yi},∀i ∈ I (15)
λ




Equation (15) can be further represented as
yk+1 = argmin{φ(y)−λ khy+ 1
2aI
yT hT hy|y ∈ Y} (17)
Utilizing variational inequality and convexity of φ(.), yk+1 ∈
Y generated by (17) satisfies
∀y ∈ Y, φ(y)−φ(yk+1)
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+(y− yk+1)T
{





Substituting (16) into (18), we get
∀y ∈ Y,φ(y)−φ(yk+1)+(y− yk+1)T (−λ k+1hT )≥ 0 (19)












+φ(y)−φ(yk+1)≥ 0,∀(y,λ ) ∈ Y ×R (20)
According to Lemma 1, let (y∗,λ ∗) be a saddle point of






F(y∗,λ ∗)≥ 0 (21)
where the mapping F(y,λ ) := [−λh,hy]T and is monotone. 1
Since (20) holds for all (y,λ ) in Y×R, and particularly for
(y∗,λ ∗), we have

















F(y∗,λ ∗)≥ 0 (23)
By monotonicity of mapping F , we have
(λ k+1−λ ∗)(λ k−λ k+1)≥ 0 (24)
which implies
|λ k+1−λ ∗|2 ≤ |λ k−λ ∗|2−|λ k−λ k+1|2 (25)
For every saddle point (y∗,λ ∗) inequality (25) holds. Denote
the set of λ ∗ as W . The term |λ k− λ ∗|2 decreases in each
iteration by an amount |λ k−λ k+1|2, so the sequence {|λ k−
λ ∗|2} converges and the sequence {λ k} is bounded. With (20)
we know that every cluster point of {λ k} belongs to W . With
(25), the sequence {λ k} only has one cluster point, and thus
{λ k} converges to a point λ ∗ ∈W . Substituting λ ∗ into (15),
we get pk→ p∗, dk→ d∗, and thus bk→ b∗.
Note that the saddle point (y∗,λ ∗) of L(y,λ ) corresponds
to a primal-dual optimal of problem (5). Since problem (5)
has a unique primal optimal (p̂, d̂), we have p∗ = p̂, d∗ = d̂;
moreover, λ ∗ = ζ̂ is a dual optimal. Therefore, (p∗,d∗,b∗) is
a GNE of the energy sharing game G.
Proposition 4 offers a guidance for selecting parameter a to
implement the proposed mechanism. It also verifies that {λ k}





converges to the “shadow price” ζ̂ of problem (5); moreover,
as shown in the proof of Proposition 3, ζ̂ approaches λ̃m as
I→ ∞. Therefore, the energy sharing price is meaningful by
measuring the value of production-consumption balance.
Assumption A4 is practical. The simulation in Section V-
B shows that the bidding process converges with a wide
range of a, even for some cases where a violates A4 (which
is a sufficient but not necessary condition for convergence).
Although we call a market sensitivity, it is indeed a parameter
in the set rule for market clearing. We can adjust a to satisfy
A4, in which case the prosumers still have incentives to
participate in energy sharing, as claimed by Proposition 2.
Remark: The proposed bidding process falls in the general
category of dual gradient method. Therefore, if prosumers do
not update their bids at every time step, the process can be
modeled in a similar way as a partially asynchronous gradient
algorithm, whose convergence can be proved by [46, Section
7.5], under certain conditions such as boundedness of time
steps during which a prosumer keeps missing its update.
C. Prosumer Rationality and Economic Intuition
First, by Proposition 4, the bidding process converges
to a GNE of game (4), at which the market is cleared:
∑i∈I qi = ∑i∈I(−aλ + bi) = 0, and each prosumer achieves
power balance: pi + qi = pi− aλ + bi = di. To generate such
a reasonable outcome, we assume the market is executed
only after the bidding process converges. Second, during the











where λ k is the market announced price for the current itera-
tion and (di− pi)/(2a(I−1)) is the predicted impact of pro-
sumer i’s decision on price, so that λ k +(di− pi)/(2a(I−1))
is prosumer i’s predicted price for the next iteration. The term
(di− pi) following the predicted price is prosumer i’s unmet
demand which it needs to buy from the market. In summary,
prosumer i produces pi, consumes di, and buys (di− pi) from
the market, and its rationality is to minimize its own net cost
(production cost - utility + purchase cost from market) while
considering its impact on market price. Third, even though
the self power balance constraint (4b) is not explicitly in (14),
it is satisfied at equilibrium as each prosumer consistently






With the proposed bidding process, we also have an intuitive
explanation for Proposition 3. As said, prosumers update their
bids considering their impact on price λ . When there is a
small number I of prosumers, they constitute a monopolistic
competition market, where the impact of each prosumer’s
strategy on price cannot be neglected. When I is large enough,
the market is close to perfectly competitive, and each prosumer
has an infinitesimal influence on price λ , which can be






Following a similar procedure to the proof of Proposition 4,
we can show that as I → ∞, the bidding process with (26)
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converges to the optimal solution of problem (1), which is the
second statement of Proposition 3.
V. SIMULATION
Numerical experiments are conducted to validate theoretical
results. We first run a simple three-prosumer case to verify
convergence of the bidding process and efficiency of GNE.
A. Simple Example with Three Prosumers
In the three-prosumer case, market sensitivity is set at




i pi, and util-













∀i∈ {1,2,3} and other parameters are given in TABLE II–III.




k over iterations are shown in Fig. 3. We observe
that prosumer strategies and the energy sharing price converge
in about 6 iterations. At GNE, the gap between demand and
production of a prosumer needs to be bought from the market.


















































Fig. 3. Prosumers’ strategies and sharing price over iterations.
TABLE II








Prosumer ($/kWh2) ($/kWh) ($/kWh2) ($/kWh)
1 0.015 0.038 -0.008 0.8
2 0.008 0.047 -0.014 0.5
3 0.011 0.056 -0.009 0.4
TABLE III
PHYSICAL LIMITS OF PROSUMERS
Prosumer pi(kWh) pi(kWh) di(kWh) di(kWh)
1 0 20 5 15
2 0 25 7 18
3 0 30 10 25
The (p̂, d̂) at GNE, the social optimal (p̃, d̃) solved from
(1), and the self-sufficiency strategy (p̌, ď) solved from (6) are
compared in TABLE IV. The net costs of all the prosumers are
negative, satisfying Assumption A3. Though the centralized
social optimal achieves the highest total net utility $ 10.98, two
prosumers become worse-off compared with self-sufficiency:
Prosumer 2’s net utility decreases from $ 2.33 to $ 0.68,
and Prosumer 3 from $ 1.44 to $ 1.39. Therefore, Prosumers
2 and 3 may not have the incentive to participate in the
centralized operation. Under the proposed energy sharing
mechanism, Prosumer 1’s net utility increases from $ 6.25
to $ 6.90, Prosumer 2 from $ 2.33 to $ 2.59, and Prosumer
3 keeps the same. This verifies Proposition 2 and shows
superior incentive of the proposed mechanism compared to the
centralized operation. Moreover, the relative gap between the
social optimal and GNE is only (10.98-10.94)/10.98=0.36%,
which verifies efficiency of the energy sharing mechanism.
TABLE IV
COMPARISON OF THREE SCHEMES
Prosumer (p̂, d̂) (p̃, d̃) (p̌, ď)
1 (9.3,15.0) (8.1,15.0) (15.0,15.0)
Net cost($) -6.90 -8.91 -6.25
2 (13.6,8.4) (14.6,7.8) (10.3,10.3)
Net cost($) -2.59 -0.68 -2.33
3 (10.5,10.0) (10.2,10.0) (10.0, 10.0)
Net cost($) -1.44 -1.39 -1.44
Total net cost ($) -10.94 -10.98 -10.03
We further show the potential of the proposed mechanism in
restraining the influence of information asymmetry. Informa-
tion asymmetry is a crucial problem in market. It describes the
situation where a party with more information than others may
deliberately misrepresent its information to gain more profit,
leading to imbalanced market power or even market failure






1 ) from 0.8 to
1.2 times its original value, and show in Fig. 4 the impact of
Prosumer 1’s misrepresentation on market equilibrium.






































































































































































































(a) Prosumer 1 (b) Prosumer 2
(c) Prosumer 3 (d) Total
Centralized method Energy sharing method
Fig. 4. Changes of net utility under the centralized and proposed mechanisms.
Fig. 4 shows that, under centralized operation, Prosumer
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1 ) to increase its net
utility. One consequence, however, is that the net utilities of
Prosumers 2 and 3 decline, so does the total net utility of
three prosumers. In contrast, under the proposed mechanism,







since this leads to its maximum net utility. In this case,
information asymmetry does not spoil market equilibrium,
which is another merit of the proposed mechanism.
We then illustrate convergence of the bidding process when
every prosumer randomly misses its update every iteration
with probability 0.8. We change the upper bound of time delay
(defined as the number of consecutive iterations during which
a prosumer misses its update) from 3 to 9, and the iterates
of energy sharing prices are recorded in Fig.5. The energy
sharing prices converge under all the different upper bounds
of time delay, which indicates that our proposed mechanism is
efficient with asynchronous update. Moreover, when a larger
upper bound of time delay is allowed, it takes longer time to
reach the market equilibrium.





























Fig. 5. Prices under different upper bounds of update time delay.
B. Cases with More Prosumers
We run simulation in a larger case with 50 prosumers
to show scalability of the proposed bidding process. Pro-
sumer parameters are uniformly randomly sampled from the
following ranges: α1i ∈ [0.01,0.02], α2i ∈ [0.02,0.08], β 1i ∈
[−0.01,−0.005], β 2i ∈ [0,1], pi ∈ [20,40], di ∈ [5,10], di ∈
[15,30], and pi is set to zero, ∀i ∈ {1, ...,50}. We test cases
with a = 25, 50, 75, 100, and 125. The change of energy
sharing price over iterations under each a is plot in a line
in Fig. 6. When a = 25, Assumption A4 is violated and the
bidding process fails to converge; for other cases, the price
converges in about 8 iterations, showing practicability of the
proposed process. Note that even for convergent cases a = 50,
75, 100, 125, A4 is not always met. In other words, A4 is a
sufficient but not necessary condition for convergence.
We next test the proposed mechanism with a growing
number of prosumers. Increase from 2 to 50 prosumers while
selecting parameters in the same way as above and fixing
a = 100. The PoA defined in (9) is recorded in Fig. 7 for five
runs (each with a different realization of random parameters).
For each case, the PoA converges to 1 as the number of
prosumers grows, which validates Proposition 3.
We further investigate how prosumer diversity would influ-
ence the outcome of energy sharing. The number of prosumers



























Fig. 6. Change of sharing price over iterations, under different a.



























Fig. 7. Price of Anarchy (PoA) with an increasing number of prosumers.
is fixed to 100. At the beginning, all the prosumers have
the same parameters, including cost function, utility function,
upper/lower bounds pi, pi,di,di,∀i ∈ I. Then, we gradually
add diversity by increasing the number of prosumer types
2. Fifty (50) random scenarios are tested for each degree
of diversity, and the mean and variance of the relative cost
difference (saving) of energy sharing versus self-sufficiency
are plotted in Fig.8. With a growing diversity, the mean
saving increases, and the variance of saving decays, which
demonstrates that more diversified prosumers can lead to more
efficient and stable performance of energy sharing.
VI. CONCLUSION
We proposed a scalable distributed mechanism for energy
sharing to better invoke prosumer flexibility. In the proposed
mechanism, a prosumer sends a bid to the market platform
without revealing its private information, while its adjustable
production and demand and capacity constraints are fully
considered. The energy sharing mechanism is modeled as a
generalized Nash game, whose equilibrium always exists and
is partially unique. At equilibrium, a Pareto improvement is
achieved so that every prosumer has the incentive to participate
in sharing. By analyzing the price-of-anarchy (PoA), we
proved that the performance of energy sharing approaches
2A prosumer i ∈ I in this paper is characterized by four factors: cost
function fi(.), utility function ui(.), lower and upper bounds of production
pi, pi, lower and upper bounds of demand di,di. These four parameters define
a “prosumer type”; specifically, prosumers who have the same value of these
parameters are called the same type of prosumers.
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Fig. 8. Change of performance of energy sharing with prosumer diversity.
the centralized social optimal with an increasing number of
prosumers. A practicable bidding process is presented and
its convergence condition is provided. This paper provides
insights into market mechanism design in a prosumer era. Fu-
ture directions include incorporating renewable uncertainties,
considering bounded rationality, and characterizing how big
data may help improve the performance of energy sharing.
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